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Amitabh Das, Graduate Student Member, IEEE, Barıs¸ Ege, Santosh Ghosh, Lejla Batina and Ingrid
Verbauwhede, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Test compression is widely used for reducing test
time and cost of a VLSI circuit. It is also claimed to provide
security against scan based side-channel attacks. This paper
pursues the legitimacy of this claim and presents scan attack
vulnerabilities of test compression schemes used in commercial
EDA tools. A publicly available AES design is used and test
compression structures provided by Synopsys, Cadence and
Mentor Graphics DfT tools are inserted into the design. Exper-
imental results of the differential scan attacks employed in this
paper suggest that tools using X-masking and X-tolerance are
vulnerable and leak information about the secret key. Differential
scan attacks on these schemes have been demonstrated to have a
best case success rate of 94.22% and 74.94% respectively for
a random scan design. On the other hand, time compaction
seems to be the strongest choice with the best case success
rate of 3.55%. In addition, similar attacks are also performed
on existing scan attack countermeasures proposed in literature,
thus experimentally evaluating their practical security. Finally,
a suitable countermeasure is proposed and compared to the
previously proposed countermeasures.
Index Terms—Test compression, Security, Scan attack, Adaptive
scan, OPMISR, Embedded deterministic test, countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
In VLSI industry, design for testability (DfT) infrastructure
is included in most circuits for efficient testing of the final
product. However when circuits with cryptographic algorithms
are concerned, the testing functionality can be exploited by an
attacker to recover the secret key used for encryption. These
attacks can be categorized as a form of side channel attacks,
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which target the scan chain structure widely deployed as a
DfT technique.
Scan chains were exploited in [1] to recover secret keys of
Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) hardware implementations. Later on, these
scan based attacks are extended to break public-key ciphers
in [2]–[5]. Some of these works take into account the modern
test compression schemes and the attacks are performed on
a generic structure of the schemes. XOR-tree based test
compression was attacked successfully using the signature
attack in [6], [7], while advanced DfT structures such as X-
Masking and partial scan were attacked by a new attack in [8].
In this paper, we have performed scan based side-channel
attacks on popular DfT structures generated by the major
test tools of leading EDA vendors: Synopsys, Cadence, and
Mentor Graphics. The specific test structures are incorporated
on an AES circuit using the DfT toolkits. Success rates
of the attacks are reported in this paper for different DfT
configurations. Though AES is taken as a case study, the scan
attack principle outlined in this work is also applicable for
symmetric-key ciphers which have similar diffusion properties.
One of the purpose of this paper is to illustrate that the
classical differential scan attack (DSA) principle [1] is still
useful for attacking advanced DfT structures such as test
compression with X-Tolerant and X-Masking by enhancing
it further using techniques outlined in this paper and in [9].
Apart from performing DSA on industrial test structure,
another contribution of the paper is to analyze the security
provided by the scan attack countermeasures. Finally, we
propose a new countermeasure along with experimental results
which ensures security against DSA, albeit with increase in
test cost. The preliminary scan attack results on generic test
compression structures were presented in [9] along with a
brief discussion on the effectiveness of scan attack coun-
termeasures. This work employs the same attack principle
as in [9]. However, substantial expansion has been made
by providing comprehensive scan attack success results on
AES in the presence of actual test compression and X-state
handling schemes included in commercial test tools for a wide
distribution of active scan chains, active slices and distribu-
tions of key-dependent flip-flops (KFFs) on active slices and
scan chains. Moreover, an analysis based on the number of
inputs required for a successful scan attack on AES designs
with test compression is also provided. Attack successes on
the scan attack countermeasures is given in detail. A noise
injector countermeasure is proposed and its implementation
and comparison with other countermeasures is provided.
2The rest of the paper is organized in the following way.
In Section II, we briefly describe the AES block cipher, scan
attack and industrial DfT techniques. Previous work on DSA
is described in Section III. We provide the motivation and
objective for our work in Section IV. The overall DSA strategy
used in this work is outlined in Section V. Sections VI, VII
and VIII provide our scan attack results on test strategies
provided by the main EDA vendors. In Section IX, we first
present DSA on the existing scan attack countermeasures,
followed by our new noise injector countermeasure. Finally,
the paper is concluded in Section X.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AES
AES [10] is one of the widely used industrial standard
block ciphers which encrypts blocks of 128-bit messages and
supports variable key sizes: 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits [10].
The AES round function consists of four operations which are
applied to the cipher state in the following order: SubBytes,
ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey. The SubBytes
operation is a non-linear transformation which operates on
each byte of the state. ShiftRows rotates the bytes in each
row of the state. The MixColumns multiplies each column
with a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) matrix of branch
number five. Therefore, each byte of the input will affect all
four bytes of the MixColumns output which forms the basis
of DSAs on AES. For instance, a nonzero byte difference
in the first byte, as in Fig. 1, will transform into a non-
zero difference after SubBytes and will not be affected by
the ShiftRows operation. This difference will be transformed
by the MixColumns operation and would lead to four non-
zero differences on that column. Since the AddRoundKey
operation simply XORs the round key to the state, it has no
effect on difference propagation as long as the same key is
used. Additionally, there is an initial key XOR step before
the encryption starts, and this is the operation that is targeted
in scan attacks to recover the encryption key of AES. In this
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Fig. 1. Difference propagation of a byte difference through an AES round.
work, we have used an open-source AES implementation from
the Gezel hardware/software co-design website [11], as our
attack target. This design contains table-lookup based S-box.
The Gezel HDL code has been converted into VHDL using
the fdlvhd converter tool and synthesized into gate-level
Verilog netlist using Synopsys Design Compiler v2009.06 with
a Faraday 130 nm library, on which the test compression
structures are added.
B. Introduction to Scan Attack on AES
The target of scan attacks is generally the register storing the
computation results of intermediate operations (for instance,
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Fig. 2. Generic scan compression structure with X-state handling
the AES round register). Scan attacks are possible even if the
secret key register is not included in the scan chains. The
ability of the circuit to switch between normal and test mode
is exploited in scan-based attacks. Following are the steps that
are generally employed for mounting such an attack on an
AES implementation:
• The AES circuit is run in functional mode for one round
mode after feeding the desired plaintext input.
• The AES circuit is put in test mode by enabling the scan
enable pin.
• The contents of the AES round register are scanned out
and stored.
• The process is repeated several times for different pairs
of inputs with a fixed Hamming distance, and an offline
evaluation of the scan outputs is made to take a decision
on the secret key.
Differential scan attack exploits the fact that two particular
inputs to the round function of AES can transform into output
vectors with a unique Hamming distance difference after one
round of encryption.
C. Industrial Test Compression Schemes
Test compression is now widely deployed in the semicon-
ductor industry for testing complex circuits in a short time
without compromising on test quality. An example of a space
compaction scheme using output XOR gates is shown in Fig.
2. Each key-dependent bit (KFF) in the figure is a part of
the intermediate register. In the figure, each column of scan
flip/flops represents a slice. A slice containing at least one
KFF is called an active slice. Similarly, an active scan chain
is defined as a scan chain containing at least one KFF. Fig. 2
shows a scan design with 3 KFFs which are distributed over
2 active scan chains and 2 active slices. In this work, attack
success rates are presented for a scan structure containing a
maximum of 32 scan chains and 32 active slices. The number
32 is chosen in this paper because it corresponds to the four
bytes affected by the AES Mix Columns operation. When
test vectors are generated for a circuit by an automatic test
pattern generator (ATPG), most of the test vector bits are
unspecified, or don’t care states, which are randomly filled
with 0s or 1s, to enable their use on an Automatic Test
Equipment (ATE). These states can be removed from the
test vectors in an efficient manner using test compression,
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Fig. 3. X-Tolerant compressor logic structure.
allowing for substantial reduction in test time and cost. The
three popular industrial test compression tools are Synopsys
DFTMAX employing Adaptive Scan, Cadence Encounter Test
using OPMISR, and Mentor Graphics Tessent TestKompress
using Embedded Deterministic Test (EDT). In addition to
providing space compaction, industrial DfT tools also have
provisions such as X-tolerance and X-masking for dealing with
unknown values (X-states).
Fig. 3 shows the structure of a X-Tolerant space com-
pressor employed in Synopsys Adaptive Scan [12]. Due to
the combination of different scan chain outputs at the space
compactor, when DSA is considered, there is further loss of
observability of the internal states of the scan chains compared
to a simple XOR tree. The other technique, X-masking, as
shown in Fig. 2, blocks certain parts of the scan chains which
contain a higher probability of unknown states (X-states). This
is achieved by inserting a mask layer between the test outputs
and the test response compactor. The mask can be static as
in OPMISR or dynamic as in EDT. As shown in the figure,
in static masking a fixed mask value feeds the mask decoder,
whereas in dynamic masking, part of the input vector is given
to the decoder to generate a variable mask. This masking
makes DSA even more difficult as some of the KFFs are not
present in the compacted output anymore. Time compaction
uses sequential logic to compact test responses. Here, multiple
input signature registers (MISRs) are employed to reduce test
time. In order to minimize the need to shift out test responses,
the scan cell outputs are compressed into a signature with
a MISR [13]. In Built-in Self-Test(BIST), this compressed
signature is compared with a golden signature.
Since in test compression schemes, the externally observ-
able values are only the compressed stimuli and compacted
responses, one would expect them to have some security
properties as well. The theoretical security analysis of EDT
was presented in [14], while the security claims of Tessent
TestKompress tool are investigated in a Mentor Graphics
whitepaper [15]. Although no such security claims have been
made to-date from Cadence and Synopsys, they offer similar
test response compaction structures.
III. PREVIOUS WORK
The target of scan attacks is generally the register storing the
computation results of intermediate operations (for instance,
the AES round register). Scan attacks are possible even if the
secret key register is not included in the scan chains. The
ability of the circuit to switch between normal and test mode
is exploited in scan based attacks. DSA is based on the fact
that two particular inputs to the round function of AES can
transform into output vectors with a unique Hamming distance
difference after one round of encryption.
Scan based attack on AES appears in [1], in which a two-
step approach employing chosen plaintexts for attacking the
round register of AES is presented. In the first step, the
scan chain structure is determined and then the round key
is recovered in the second step. This proceeds as follows: the
chip is run in functional mode for one clock cycle. The result
after the first round is stored in the round register. Then the
chip is switched to test mode and the contents of the round
register are scanned out. This step is repeated for another
plaintext input differing in only one byte. Analyzing the
distribution of the output Hamming distances for all possible
27 pairs generated with byte difference (01)x in their LSB,
one can easily verify that there are four Hamming distance
values (9, 12, 23 and 24) which can only be generated by a
unique pair of inputs. Therefore, whenever such a Hamming
distance is observed between the output vectors, one can XOR
the corresponding plaintext byte with the pre-computed values
to recover a byte of the encryption key.
Scan chains are usually combined with test compression
in order to reduce test time and cost of a complex circuit
without compromising test quality. Some recent works on
scan attacks [6]–[8] consider test compression to some extent.
An XOR tree space compactor has been targeted in [6], [7].
However, commercial EDA tools provide several space and
time compaction options including X-state handling, which
are much more complex than XOR trees. These test schemes
reduce the amount of observability on the scan outputs and
also the correspondence to the internal scan chain contents for
DSA. Hence, in [8], a new attack is proposed which is able
to deal with these advanced test compression infrastructures.
In that paper, the authors search for a particular difference
after the non-linear substitution operation of the AES round,
thereby exploiting the widely used linear structures in the test
compression schemes.
IV. MOTIVATION
As described in Section II, commercial EDA tools provide
several variants of space and time compaction techniques.
The X-tolerant/ X-masking space compaction and MISR-
based time compaction logic present in these tools are much
more complex than simple XOR trees assumed in some of
the previous works. These complex test structures are very
often used in practical cryptographic circuits to meet cur-
rent market demands of reducing test time, achieving lower
product cost, and faster time-to-market. In this paper, these
advanced test compression techniques are targeted depicting
their vulnerability to DSA introduced in [1] and improved
in [6]. This paper is aimed to show the applicability of
the attack approach followed in these works to commercial
test compression schemes and scan attack countermeasures.
4Test compression structures are emulated in software on an
AES circuit [11] followed by a statistical evaluation of attack
success rates.
Scan attack countermeasures, such as partial scan [16] and
scan chain scrambling [17] have been proposed to increase
confusion on the scan out data. In this work, the vulnerability
of these countermeasures to DSA is investigated. The coun-
termeasures are emulated in software, and DSA is performed
to illustrate their susceptibility to scan attacks. We enhance
the scan attack principles outlined in [1], [6] by combining
multiple attacks with distinct input differences to improve the
attack success rate when applied to commercial test compres-
sion schemes and scan attack countermeasures. Moreover, we
present comprehensive attack results for the popular space and
time compaction techniques and countermeasures for different
distributions of key information on the scan infrastructure,
which was not extensively considered earlier and is addressed
in detail in this work. Another unique feature of the current
work is the investigation of the variation of success rates with
respect to the number of test inputs.
V. ATTACK STRATEGY
A. General Scan Attack Strategy
Building upon the DSA basics given in Section III, the
following assumptions are made in the DSA presented in this
work.
• The scan enable pin can be controlled by the attacker.
• The cryptographic algorithm is known to the attacker.
• The time required to execute the target operation is known
to the attacker.
• The test structure type (space compaction, time com-
paction, X-tolerance, X-masking) is known to the at-
tacker. However, the attacker may not be aware of the
exact details of the test scheme (such as compression
ratio, number of scan chains).
The first paper that discusses the model for the attacker is [18],
whereas the attacker model specific to AES is discussed
in [19]. In addition to this, an implicit assumption in DSA
is that all FFs (except the KFFs) have the same value after
one encryption round. Thus the differential process eliminates
the effect of these FFs.
However, different from the previously published works,
evaluating test compression schemes from different EDA
vendors requires modifications to the attack implementation
applicable for generic test compression algorithms. In fact,
when X-masking or X-tolerant logic is considered, one has to
use a modified version of the key guessing strategy proposed in
the previous works. The main differences in the attack strategy
used in this work and the previous works is that multiple
byte differences are used for attacking designs, and the attacks
are repeated for random test inputs depending on the testing
scheme under security analysis.
The DSA outlined in this paper is performed on the software
emulation of the DfT structures. The approach taken in our
attack is presented in Fig. 4. It is divided into two phases: an
online phase and an offline phase. In the online phase, testing
structure of industrial DfT solutions is derived by inserting
AES circuit 
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Fig. 4. Combined hardware/software scan attack approach.
DfT functionality to an AES design using the DfT tools. Also,
possible inputs to the round function of AES are derived for
corresponding input differences in one byte. In the offline
phase, the scan attack is performed by emulating the DfT
structures in a C program, making use of the XOR differences
and possible inputs derived in the online phase. An attack
is deemed to be successful whenever the correct key byte is
suggested as the most likely key byte after the attack. Success
rates are computed over 10000 random permutations of KFFs.
All the attack successes presented in the following sections
are obtained employing attack codes written in C customized
for the specific test compression structure or scan attack
countermeasure. Simulations are performed on a 64-bit x86-64
Intel Core i7-2600 CPU running at 3.4 GHz having 7 virtual
processors and 8GB of RAM.
B. Distributions Considered
The AES round register can be spread in the scan structure
in several ways unknown to the attacker. This work considers
the following distributions of active slices and active scan
chains to cover the most typical scenarios:
• 32 active scan chains with active slices varying from 16
to 32.
• 32 active slices with active scan chains varying from 16
to 32.
• 24 active scan chains with 24 active slices.
In AES, one byte of input difference can affect up to 32 bits
of the round register due to the Mix Column operation after
one round. Therefore, there can be at most 32 KFFs would
be in the scan structure. This indicates that there will be at
most 32 active scan chains when each scan chain contains one
KFF. Similarly, there will be at most 32 active slices when each
slice contains one KFF. These represent two extreme cases. To
consider other practical scenarios, the number of active scan
chains is varied from 32 to 16 keeping active slices fixed at
32, and vice-versa. An intermediate scenario of 24 active scan
chains and 24 active slices is also considered to show the effect
of different KFF distributions when the number of active slices
and active scan chains is fixed. Table I shows the distributions
used in the paper. Even if AES forms a small part of an
industrial SoC consisting of millions of gates, the distributions
considered in this paper are still applicable. Independent of
the size of the design, the maximum number of active slices
or active scan chains is always equal to 32 (as only 32 FFs
would be key-dependent and the rest unrelated when subjected
to DSAs).
5TABLE I
DISTRIBUTIONS FOR 24 ACTIVE SLICES / SCAN CHAINS
# Distribution
1 {2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
2 {3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
3 {3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
4 {3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
5 {3, 3, 3, 3, 1, . . . , 1}
6 {4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
7 {4, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
8 {4, 3, 3, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
9 {4, 4, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
10 {4, 4, 3, 1, . . . , 1}
11 {5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
12 {5, 3, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
13 {5, 3, 3, 1, . . . , 1}
14 {5, 4, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
15 {5, 5, 1, . . . , 1}
16 {6, 2, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
17 {6, 3, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
18 {6, 4, 1, . . . , 1}
19 {7, 2, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
20 {7, 3, 1, . . . , 1}
21 {8, 2, 1, . . . , 1}
22 {9, 1, . . . , 1}
In the table, each digit represents the number of KFFs in
one slice. There are 24 KFFs in total in each distribution.
For instance, the first distribution has two KFFs on 8 slices,
and one KFF each on another 8 slices. Similarly, for the
22nd distribution, there are 9 KFFs on one slice and one
KFF each on 15 slices. Since there are 22 possible choices
for distributing active slices, there are a total of 222 = 484
distributions with 24 active slices and 24 active scan chains.
These distributions are in fact all possible choices to distribute
32 KFFs over 24 active slices / scan chains. Since in these
distributions, there are multiple FFs on each active slice, we
consider cases where one KFF would mask another on the
same slice, as is possible in a realistic scenario.
VI. SCAN ATTACK ON SYNOPSYS ADAPTIVE SCAN
A. Introduction to Adaptive Scan
Adaptive scan is the test compression architecture used in
the Synopsys DFTMAX test tool. At the input side, there are
multiplexers to enable testing of multiple scan chains using a
reduced number of scan inputs. At the output side, there is
an XOR network to connect multiple scan chains to reduce
the number of test outputs. This way compression is achieved
without compromising on testability. The output side XOR
compactor network is also known as the unload compressor
which provides an X-tolerant design. This helps in diagnosing
high volume of scan pattern failures which can be observed
on the tester [13]. The X-tolerant compressor [20] is based
on an algorithm derived from Steiner systems, and provides
a good balance between scan compression, and silicon area.
To prevent aliasing, cancellation of simultaneous faults on
two or more chains, a unique combination of sub-scan chains
connects to each compactor output. This combination depends
on the compaction structure employed. Sometimes, the outputs
are computed by XORing disjoint subsets of scan outputs.
Since the X-tolerant XOR compressor used in Adaptive
Scan has a different structure than an XOR-tree, DSA success
rates are expected to be different than the success rates for
the attacks available in the literature. Observed Hamming
distances vary depending on the structure of the XOR network,
therefore providing some security through obscurity as long as
the structure of the XOR connections is not known. However,
this compressor also leaks information on the Hamming dis-
tance (HD) between outputs as it consists of linear operations.
B. Description of the Attack
Similar to the initial attack in [1], our scan attack consists
of two main steps. First, all 256 possible values are given
to the first byte of the plaintext and corresponding first
round outputs are collected. In the second step, these outputs
are paired depending on the selected input difference and
the Hamming distance between them is computed. Unlike
previous works, we use five different XOR differences (namely
0xD1,0x01,0x89,0x4A,0x69) to amplify the visibility
of the correct key among other key guesses. Note that all test
outputs are XORed together to obtain a single value for the
Hamming distance. This is important since the structure of the
X-tolerant logic used can vary depending on the number of
scan chains and the number of test outputs in the design. The
X-tolerant logic used in this work has been derived from an
actual test compression DfT insertion with a 32:8 compressor
on the AES design by Synopsys DFT Compiler. It combines
the scan chain outputs in the following way:
out0 = s2 ⊕ s5 ⊕ s24 ⊕ s26 ⊕ s19 ⊕ s13 ⊕ s8 ⊕ s29 ⊕ s16 ⊙
s22 ⊕ s0 ⊕ s11
out1 = s3 ⊕ s8 ⊕ s5 ⊕ s27 ⊕ s16 ⊕ s18 ⊕ s13 ⊕ s21 ⊕ s23 ⊕
s29 ⊕ s0 ⊕ s10
out2 = s28 ⊕ s25 ⊕ s17 ⊕ s20 ⊕ s22 ⊕ s14 ⊕ s9 ⊕ s3 ⊕ s31 ⊙
s6 ⊕ s0 ⊙ s11
out3 = ¬s30 ⊕ s27 ⊕ s14 ⊕ s19 ⊕ s21 ⊕ s1 ⊕ s6 ⊕ s22 ⊕ s3
⊕ s8 ⊕ s11 ⊕ s17
out4 = s1 ⊙ s9 ⊕ s12 ⊕ s15 ⊕ s18 ⊕ s4 ⊕ s26 ⊕ s20 ⊕ s31 ⊙
s6 ⊕ s23 ⊕ s29
out5 = ¬s30 ⊕ s27 ⊕ s14 ⊕ s19 ⊕ s25 ⊕ s12 ⊕ s7 ⊕ s4 ⊕ s1 ⊕
s9 ⊕ s16 ⊙ s22
out6 = s10 ⊕ s7 ⊕ s13 ⊕ s21 ⊕ s28 ⊕ s15 ⊕ s31 ⊕ s2 ⊕ s24 ⊕
s26 ⊕ s18 ⊕ s4
out7 = s28 ⊕ s25 ⊕ s17 ⊕ s20 ⊕ ¬s30 ⊙ s23 ⊙ s12 ⊕ s15 ⊕ s2
⊕ s5 ⊕ s10 ⊕ s7
where si, i ∈ {0, . . . , 31} are the scan chain outputs.
In the compactor structure above, each scan chain occurs
at least twice at the compactor outputs to satisfy the X-
Tolerant requirement of canceling X-states occurring on the
scan chains. Since all the scan chains are included more
than once, evaluating compactor outputs separately can result
in an incorrect estimation of the actual Hamming distance
between the corresponding scan designs. Therefore, the test
outputs are XORed to make sure that the observed Hamming
distance is smaller than or equal to the actual Hamming
distance.This is due to the fact that without the knowledge
of the exact structure of the output compactor, it would not be
possible to tell which scan chains contribute to the differences
observed in particular compactor outputs. In some cases that
we observed for different X-tolerant logic designs generated
by Synopsys, a scan chain is included in an even number
6of compactor outputs. In this case, XORing the compactor
outputs will cancel out these scan chain outputs, therefore
degrading the observability of the actual Hamming distance
between two scan designs. When the case in the example
above is considered, one can easily see that s22 and s24 are the
only ones that are included in an even number of times in the
compactor output. Therefore, when performing the analysis,
they will be canceled out and therefore information about
two particular scan chains s22 and s24 will be lost. Hence,
a decrease in the success rate for a random distribution of
KFFs is to be expected when compared to an XOR tree.
A key guess is performed if the observed Hamming distance
is one of the extreme cases. For example for the XOR differ-
ence 0xD1, we make a key guess if the observed Hamming
distance is less than 5 or 9, and if it is exactly equal to 23
or 24. Our experiments show that this approach improves the
overall success rate of the attack.
C. Attack results
Table II summarizes the attack success for different number
of active slices and active scan chains. The results suggest that
the attack success decreases with decrease in the number of
active slices. However, it seems that the success rate is affected
to a much smaller extent with variations in the number of
active scan chains.
TABLE II
DSA SUCCESS RATES FOR X-TOLERANT LOGIC FOR DIFFERENT
DISTRIBUTIONS
#Active Scan Chains = 32 #Active Slices = 32
#Active Success #Active Scan Success
Slices Rate Chains Rate
32 74.94% 32 74.94%
31 71.22% 31 74.83%
30 70.24% 30 74.24%
29 66.35% 29 74.11%
28 62.65% 28 74.28%
27 60.60% 27 74.45%
26 59.16% 26 74.22%
25 57.93% 25 74.13%
24 57.26% 24 74.06%
23 55.90% 23 74.19%
22 54.38% 22 74.56%
21 49.65% 21 73.58%
20 50.66% 20 61.98%
19 49.79% 19 56.65%
18 44.62% 18 56.78%
17 37.59% 17 57.34%
16 30.26% 16 56.09%
Fig. 5 tells another interesting story. Although the number
of active slices affects the success rate quite significantly (see
Table II), it seems the effect on the distribution over 24 active
slices is minimal. When the number of active slices and active
scan chains are both fixed at 24, the average success rate of the
attack is around 76.01% for a random permutation of KFFs.As
stated in Section VI-B, for the 32:8 X-tolerant structure used in
this work, the information on only two scan chains (namely s22
and s24) are lost after XORing the two test outputs. Although
the loss of information is minimal, some distributions of scan
chains lead to further reductions in the observed Hamming
distance value. Hence, the success rate is inevitably degraded.
Experiments are repeated for 10000 random distributions of
KFFs to have reliable statistics on the attack success. It takes
an average of 1.28 milliseconds to perform the attack once,
using the configuration mentioned in Section V.
Fig. 5. Success rate of the attack on Adaptive Scan for 24 active scan chains
and 24 active slices (Distributions from Table I)
VII. SCAN ATTACK ON CADENCE OPMISR
A. Introduction to Cadence OPMISR
OPMISR (On-Product MISR) is one of the main features
included in the Cadence Encounter Test toolkit [13]. The
essential part of OPMISR is space compaction employing
XOR trees against which DSA in [6] is effective. OPMISR
has an optional feature of X-state handling using static X-
masking. Although X-masking is used for testing purposes,
it can enhance security by reducing the observability of the
internal registers in a design. Time compaction with Multiple
Input Signature Registers (MISRs) is another optional feature
provided by OPMISR. We also provide results of scan attack
on combined XOR-tree, static X-masking, and MISR struc-
tures.
B. Description of the Attack
As in Section VI, the attack consists of two stages. First, all
256 possible values are given to the first byte of the plaintext
and the corresponding test outputs are collected. In the second
stage, the test outputs are paired depending on the chosen
XOR difference and a key guess is made depending on the
Hamming distance between output pairs. This two-stage attack
is repeated multiple times for different mask values, so that
the correct key guess eventually overwhelms the incorrect key
guesses, and becomes the top key candidate. Therefore, an
attack is deemed successful only if the top key candidate is
the correct one. A final note on the attack is that since it is
repeated for a number of random test inputs, only 3 different
XOR differences are used in analysis to reduce the execution
time of the attack.
In Fig. 6, the trend in success rate in comparison to the
number of test inputs used is presented. It can be observed
from the figure that the attacks on masking schemes are more
successful if a larger collection of random test inputs are used
to mount an attack.
C. DSA on XOR Compaction with Static X-Masking
The attack success not only depends on the number of active
slices, but also on the number of active scan chains. This
7Fig. 6. Change in success rate with respect to # of test inputs (or masks)
used for the attack.
is due to the fact that a smaller number of scan chains can
be covered more frequently since a static mask with a lower
Hamming weight would be sufficient to include all of them.
For instance, let there be c active scan chains in the design.
Statistically, once in 2c different masks, all KFFs will affect
the test outputs, therefore giving a better chance of mounting
a successful attack. Hence, the smaller number of active scan
chains present in the design, the better the success rates will
be for the attack. Also it should be noted that even when the
number of active scan chains and active slices are fixed, the
attack success will be affected by the distribution of KFFs
over the scan structure.
Table III shows DSA success rates in percentages for
varying active scan chains and active slices. The results
illustrate that there is a substantial fall in the success rates
with decreasing number of active slices when the number of
active scan chains is kept fixed. However, when the number of
active slices is fixed, there is a small increase in success rates
as the number of active scan chains is reduced. This shows
that the dependency of DSA is more on active slices than on
active scan chains. This observed behaviour is due to KFFs on
the same slice being XORed together and therefore reducing
the observed Hamming distance value in the test output.
TABLE III
DSA SUCCESS RATES FOR STATIC MASKING FOR DIFFERENT
DISTRIBUTIONS
#Active Scan Chains = 32 #Active Slices = 32
#Active Success #Active Scan Success
Slices Rate Chains Rate
32 81.91% 32 81.91%
31 77.48% 31 83.26%
30 72.02% 30 83.76%
29 66.79% 29 86.07%
28 63.21% 28 86.14%
27 56.88% 27 88.19%
26 53.24% 26 88.03%
25 49.21% 25 88.30%
24 44.39% 24 89.82%
23 41.25% 23 91.09%
22 37.81% 22 91.77%
21 33.19% 21 92.28%
20 30.39% 20 92.60%
19 27.94% 19 93.13%
18 25.29% 18 93.78%
17 22.63% 17 94.49%
16 20.75% 16 94.22%
Fig. 7 shows the change in the success rate of the attack with
different distributions having the same number of active scan
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Fig. 7. Success rate of the attack on OPMISR (space compaction only) for
24 active scan chains and 24 active slices (Distributions from Table I)
chains and active slices. There are two important observations
which can be made from Fig. 7. Firstly, distribution of KFFs
over active slices will affect the success rate as it determines
how fast the information is processed by the compactor. For
instance, when the distribution 22 in Table I is considered for
the active slices, it is clear that 9 KFFs will be processed in
one test clock. However, for distribution 4, it would take 3
test clocks to process the same amount of information, which
means less information is lost and eventually the observed
Hamming distance after the compactor is more likely to
be successfully attacked. Hence, it is realistic to expect a
change in success rates inversely proportional to the increasing
number of KFFs on a single slice. Similarly, when 9 KFFs are
grouped on a single scan chain, information on those KFFs
will be included with probability 1
2
. If we again compare it to
distribution 4 for the active scan chains, the same KFFs would
be included in the output with probability 1
8
. Therefore, the
wider the distribution of KFFs over the active scan chains, the
lower success rates one will get when mounting the attack.
Although the above arguments can provide a designer with
options towards designing more secure scan chain structures
with the same tools that he is using, Fig. 6 should always
be kept in mind when claiming security. It should be noted
that, it is possible to make the attacker’s job harder, but it is
only a matter of resources for the attacker to recover the key
when masking schemes are considered. Applying the attack
once with 1000 inputs on a design, with a random distribution
of KFFs, takes around 0.96 seconds using the configuration
mentioned in Section V.
D. DSA on XOR Compaction, Static X-Masking and OPMISR
For the sake of completeness, the same attack is applied
for a design which uses both static X-Masking and MISRs,
therefore having both time and space compaction at the same
time. When the attack is applied using the distribution (32
active slices and 16 active scan chains) on which the attack
described in Section VII-B is most successful, success rate is
reduced from 94.22% to 3.55%. Although this gives an idea
about the security of combined time and space compaction, it
should be noted that the attack does not include any method
to exploit the MISR structure.
8Though the attack in [8] is claimed to be successful against
AES in the presence of MISR-based time compaction, it relies
on the assumption that the MISR register is observable after
each scan clock. In a real-life case, it may be possible to make
the parallel outputs of a MISR visible during testing, however
it would raise two major issues. Firstly, the gain in using
MISRs after the scan structure diminishes as they are supposed
to compress the golden value to make the testing procedure
more efficient. Secondly, if MISR content is available at all
times, then this implies that the complete scan chain contents
are available to the attacker. Therefore using the method
proposed in [1] would suffice to recover the key. In this work,
we focus only on the output signatures of MISRs, which we
believe to be a more realistic assumption, and observe that
attacking such a system would not be possible by using simple
DSA techniques.
VIII. SCAN ATTACK ON MENTOR GRAPHICS EMBEDDED
DETERMINISTIC TEST(EDT)
A. Introduction to Embedded Deterministic Test
Mentor Graphics test compression tool, Tessent TestKom-
press employs Embedded Deterministic Test (EDT) [21] [22].
Similar to test compression tools from Synopsys and Cadence,
it uses XOR trees for space compaction. However, it deals with
X-states in a different manner through the use of a dynamically
changing mask, which provides more flexibility and easy of
applicability, since knowledge of scan chains which have a
higher probability of occurrence of X-states (as in static X-
masking) is not required. This method makes use of a ring
generator (similar to a circular linear feedback shift register)
together with a phase shifter to produce independent inputs for
each scan chain. The scan outputs are compacted together with
an XOR tree which is used right after an X-masking operation.
X-masking is done with AND gates where the enabling inputs
are generated on-the-fly through a pattern mask decoder. The
masking logic varies based on a special EDT clock and test
inputs.
In [15], it is claimed that Tessent TestKompress provides
inherent security as the scan inputs and outputs are compressed
and rendered useless for an attacker. A theoretical security
analysis of EDT is provided in [14]. However, the security
claim in that work is based on the assumption that a scan
attack requires knowledge of the internal test structure and
secret registers, which may not always be valid.
B. DSA on Dynamic X-Masking
Similar to the attack described in Section VII, the scan
attack principle remains the same. However, the only differ-
ence is that the mask used in the emulation of the attack is
dynamically changing depending on the test input. First all
256 possible values are given to the first byte of the plaintext
and the first round outputs are collected. Then, the outputs are
paired depending on the selected input XOR difference and a
key guess is made. The attack is again repeated for a number
of times to be able to distinguish the correct key candidate
from others.
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Fig. 8. Success rate of the attack on EDT for 24 active scan chains and 24
active slices (Distributions from Table I)
Table IV shows DSA success rates in percentages for
varying active scan chains and active slices. Similar to the
static X-masking case presented in Section VII, the results
illustrate that there is a substantial fall in the success rates with
decreasing number of active slices when the number of active
scan chains is kept fixed. However, when the number of active
slices is fixed, the success rate stays almost the same. This is
so since the mask is assumed to be updated at each clock,
and therefore the probability of all KFFs affecting the output
only depends on the total number of KFFs, as each KFF in a
different slice should be selected at each clock individually.
This shows that the dependency of DSA for dynamic X-
Masking is much more pronounced for varying active slices,
and there is hardly any dependency on active scan chains. This
can act as a guideline for the security design engineer to place
the KFFs on specific slices during DfT insertion.
TABLE IV
DSA SUCCESS RATES FOR DYNAMIC MASKING FOR DIFFERENT
DISTRIBUTIONS
#Active Scan Chains = 32 #Active Slices = 32
#Active Success #Active Scan Success
Slices Rate Chains Rate
32 82.18% 32 82.18%
31 77.00% 31 81.87%
30 71.73% 30 81.28%
29 66.66% 29 81.37%
28 62.37% 28 82.52%
27 57.49% 27 81.77%
26 54.10% 26 81.60%
25 49.99% 25 81.74%
24 44.14% 24 81.75%
23 40.00% 23 81.48%
22 37.62% 22 81.45%
21 32.49% 21 82.58%
20 29.88% 20 81.64%
19 27.97% 19 81.19%
18 24.78% 18 80.85%
17 22.19% 17 81.88%
16 20.53% 16 81.90%
From Fig. 8, it can be inferred that the argument in Section
VII regarding the distribution of KFFs over active slices is
also valid for the case of dynamic masking. However, the
KFF distribution over the active scan chains will have no
9effect since the mask is assumed to be updated at each test
clock. Therefore, even if the KFFs are grouped in the same
active scan chain, it is equally difficult for all of them to be
picked as in distribution 1 in Table I. However if the mask
update clock is slower than the test clock, then we would see
a slight increase in success rate while more and more KFFs
are grouped at the same scan chain (as in distribution 22 in
Table I). Therefore, the cases presented in this work cover the
two extreme possibilities when the mask is not updated and
when mask update clock is the same as the test clock, giving
an idea of the cases in between. Applying this attack once with
1000 inputs on a design with a random distribution of KFFs
takes around 0.88 seconds using the configuration mentioned
in Section V.
IX. COUNTERMEASURES
In Section VII-D, we show that combined space and time
compaction can act as a suitable scan attack countermeasure
implicitly achieved through the DfT structure. To the best
of our knowledge, latest version of Cadence Encounter Test
consisting of OPMISR+ is the only DfT tool which provides
a combination of time compaction (MISRs) and space com-
paction (XOR-trees). Other EDA companies (Mentor, Synop-
sys, SynTest) have the capability to add a MISR to a design
by means of scripting to get the OPMISR+ effect. However,
in our paper, we have only considered the standard features
provided in the commercial test tools, and not any custom
extensions that can be added.
An explicit scan attack countermeasure is necessary to be
integrated with the DfT structure generated by these tools.
In this section, some of the existing explicit scan attack
countermeasures are evaluated, and a new countermeasure
is also proposed. To have a fair basis for comparing the
countermeasures considered in this section, all simulations
are run without X-masking or X-tolerant logic. Experiments
are repeated 10000 times with three distinct XOR differences
to get good statistics and only one test input is used per
attack since there are no test input dependent elements in the
proposed countermeasures.
A. Insertion of Inverters in the Scan Path
The technique is also known as the flipped scan tree
architecture [23]. It involves dividing the scan chains into a
number of sub-chains in the form of a scan tree. Sub-chains
are parts of complete scan chains which may be connected in a
random order in order to make extraction of useful information
from the scan outputs difficult for an attacker. Inverters are
inserted in front of the scan flip-flops in some secret locations.
These locations are known only to the designer and the tester,
but not to an attacker. However, as the position of the inverters
in the scan path is fixed, DSAs are immune against this
countermeasure and the same attack principle is applicable.
B. Partial Scan
This approach (also referred to as balanced secure scan)
aims to protect non-scan registers by employing a test con-
troller that enables the test mode only when an authentication
succeeds [16]. Only a few flip-flops belonging to the secret
registers are included in the scan chains. Further confusion is
added to the kernel wherever a secret register is inserted in
the scan chain.
To emulate the effect of this countermeasure in our soft-
ware implementation of the attack, we removed some of the
KFFs from the two-dimensional array used to represent the
scan chains. Then DSA is performed together with the test
compression structures. The distributions in our experiments
have 25%, 50% and 75% of the KFFs removed from the
scan chains. The average scan attack success results that we
obtained for these distributions are 24.46%, 3.01% and 0.82%
respectively. The attack is repeated 10000 times, with different
KFFs being blocked at each try. Therefore, the success rates
presented here shows the effect of partial scan countermeasure
when a randomly selected group of KFFs are blocked in a
design.
Although the results suggest that the partial scan counter-
measure is a good way to mitigate DSA on an AES design, the
cost of the countermeasure should also be taken into account.
We implemented the partial scan countermeasure following
the structure of Figure 3 in [16]. The test controller along
with the other modules were implemented in HDL and a 32-
bit LFSR is used to derive the signals which are used for
blocking a group of KFFs. Implemented this way, the partial
scan countermeasure takes 341.5 GE when synthesized using
a Faraday 130 nm technology library. This corresponds to an
area overhead of 1.95% for the partial scan countermeasure
when added to the AES design in [11], which occupies an
area of 17484.25 GEs.
C. Scan Chain Scrambling
This countermeasure proposes to divide each scan chain into
multiple scan elements and the order of connections of the
scan elements is controlled through the scan chain scrambler.
When the scan mode has been reached securely, the scan chain
elements are arranged in a predetermined order [17]. However,
in insecure mode, the order of the scan chain elements keeps
changing at a certain frequency.
As the resulting KFF distribution in insecure mode is
expected to be randomised by this countermeasure, 10000
random distributions of KFFs are used to simulate the be-
haviour of the countermeasure. The same scan attack principle
is applicable. Full information is still visible as all KFFs
contribute to the test outputs even after randomising the
KFF distributions. Hence, for each distribution, the attack
successfully recovers the correct key.
D. Masking
In [7], two masking countermeasures for protecting AES
against scan attacks were proposed. These masking schemes
are similar to the countermeasures used to protect against
differential power analysis (DPA) side-channel attacks. The
first method is based on masking the round-register data. The
mask can be added to all the 128 round-register FFs, and then
removed from the encrypted value before executing the next
AES round. The masking is effective only during testing and
10
is completely transparent in functional mode. Alternatively, to
reduce area requirements, the mask can be applied on a single
FF per slice to be protected. In this manner, the parity of
the whole slice is affected by the mask and its effects cannot
be eliminated by the attacker. The second method works by
modifying the response compactor. This is implemented by
masking the parity bitstream on the output of the test response
compactor instead of the data before being captured in the
scan chain. It makes use of an enhanced LFSR (eLFSR) that
can function either as a simple register or as an LFSR. In
functional mode, the eLFSR is loaded with a value matching
with the round-register (a 128 bit value unknown to the
attacker), or with any other value depending on the input
message and part of the secret key. In test mode, the eLFSR
provides the mask to the observed stream.
The mask register countermeasure has an area overhead of
5.9%, while the countermeasure of modifying the response
compactor has an overhead of 4.5% for the AES design
used in the paper [7] and involves storing a secret key.
The masking countermeasure can also be extended to ciphers
other than AES, for instance RSA or ECC, by masking the
intermediate registers storing the results of modular square
and multiply operations or point doubling and point addition
results respectively.
There are also other scan attack countermeasures such as the
Lock and Key Technique [24], Design for Secure Test [25] and
resetting crypto chip in test mode [17] that were not evaluated
experimentally in this work. These schemes are briefly dis-
cussed qualitatively here. The Lock and Key technique [24]
uses a plaintext key for comparison to unlock the finite state
machine used for randomizing the order in which the scan
elements are connected. In case the communication link is not
secure, an attacker can observe this key. The Design for Secure
Test [25] which checks the parity of AES rounds is an ad-hoc
solution for AES designs with a completely unrolled structure
(having high area requirements), limiting its applicability to
other designs. Though the scheme involving resetting the
crypto chip and removing all traces of cryptographic execution
in test mode [17] might provide a high level of security, it is
not applicable for implementations where some secret data
needs to be stored on-chip.
E. Proposed Countermeasure
The existing scan attack countermeasures aim at securing
uncompacted scan chain structures. However, as described
in the previous sections, practical scan structures consist of
compaction techniques which lead to a loss of observability
of internal scan chains. Hence, they may be extended into a
countermeasure. In this regard, we propose a new scan attack
countermeasure based on randomization of the compactor
outputs.
Fig. 9 shows the proposed noise injector countermeasure.
It consists of a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), a
True Random Number Generator (TRNG) and some basic
logic gates. For the particular case of Noise Injector depicted
in the figure, two OR gates, one NOR gate, one AND gate,
and one XOR gate are required. The LFSR makes a pseudo-
random selection of the test cycles when random noise is
injected into the compactor outputs. More specifically, the
compactor output is flipped if ‘A’ in Fig. 9 is 1. The signal ‘A’
is generated through a combination of TRNG and the LFSR
outputs, making it unpredictable for an attacker. Hence, the
compactor outputs becomes random and cannot be exploited
by DSA.
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Fig. 9. Noise Injector countermeasure for Injection Freq. Factor of 16
Injection frequency factor (IFF) refers to the rate at which
noise is injected into the compactor outputs, calculated as a
factor by which the test clock frequency is divided. As an
example, let us consider the LFSR structure in Fig. 9 having
a IFF of 16. Let us assume that the state bits of the LFSR
are completely random, with equal probability of occurrence
of 1s and 0s ( 1
2
). An OR gate will give an output of 0 with
probability of 1
4
. Hence the probability that both inputs of
the NOR gate are 0 (to give an output of 1) is 1
16
(as the
events are independent of each other). Only when the output
‘B’ of the NOR gate is 1, random noise is injected into
the compactor output, as the output of the TRNG and ‘B’
are connected through the AND gate. Similarly, to obtain an
injection frequency factor of 4, one of the OR gates may be
removed and the other input of the NOR gate connected to
ground (0 logic), resulting in a probability of 1
4
for obtaining
a 0 at both inputs of the NOR gate. Similar simple structures
can be designed for all the other possible cases. The gate
combination to obtain an injection frequency factor which is
not a power of 2 is also straightforward, though involving more
number of gates. For instance, to obtain an injection factor
of 5, we can construct a 4-input truth table which gives five
1s and eleven 0s at its output. One such possible expression
would be (¬I1∧¬I2∧I3)∨(I1∧I2∧¬I3)∨(I0∧¬I1∧I2∧I3),
where I0, I1, I2 and I3 represent the states at the four tap
points of the LFSR.
We have also analyzed two ways of attacking this system
to determine its security. The first attack does not use any in-
formation about the countermeasure, therefore taking a black-
box approach. The attack is applied just as it would be applied
to any other countermeasure. Results for this scan attack on
the noise injector is provided in the second column (Success
Rate1) of Table V. However, there is another way of attacking
this countermeasure. An attacker can first give the same input
to the crypto algorithm and the same test input to the test
circuit. After collecting the outputs by repeating this procedure
enough number of times, the attacker can figure out the points
where TRNG corrupts the output. Later, DSA can be applied
to the circuit with the same test input and these bits can be
removed from the test output as they have the potential to
corrupt the test output. We simulated the attack in software
and the probability of such an attack to be successful for a
random design is presented in the third column (Success Rate2)
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TABLE V
CHANGE IN SUCCESS RATE VS HOW FREQUENTLY A RANDOM BIT IS
XORED TO THE COMPACTOR OUTPUT
Injection Freq. Factor Success Rate1 Success Rate2
16 63.33% 81.37%
15 59.17% 78.70%
14 54.37% 75.53%
13 49.34% 72.79%
12 43.78% 68.93%
11 37.71% 66.31%
10 32.76% 60.57%
9 28.52% 56.99%
8 23.55% 52.53%
7 18.77% 47.70%
6 15.05% 40.62%
5 11.91% 33.02%
4 8.32% 23.04%
3 5.51% 12.85%
2 2.93% 3.38%
1 0.90% 0.00%
of Table V. As is evident from the table, success rate of the
attack decreases drastically when noise is injected at a higher
frequency. Attack success reduces to only 0.9% when noise
injected at the same frequency as the test clock.
Test coverage of the circuit is not affected by the proposed
countermeasure with the following conditions:
• The LFSR structure (feedback polynomial, output points
and seed value) should be known to the tester.
• The test cycles should be ignored when signal ‘B’ is 1
(Fig. 9).
• For achieving complete test coverage, the test patterns
for ignored test cycles should be repeated until signal
‘B’ becomes 0 (sustained vector technique).
The knowledge of the TRNG outputs is not required by the
tester, as the test cycles when signal ‘B’ = 1 are always ignored
irrespective of signal ‘C’. We suggest to have dedicated test
outputs while incorporating our proposed countermeasure. In
case of pin constrained applications, the test outputs may
be multiplexed with some of the primary outputs. To make
the proposed scheme compatible for such applications, an
additional control circuit is required which configures the
whole cryptographic circuit based on its mode of operation.
In normal mode, the noise injector is not connected to the
compactor outputs, while in test mode it is connected. This
could be realized by multiplexers controlled by the mode
selection input pin.
A TRNG is used instead of a LFSR for generating the ran-
dom input ‘C’ as a LFSR has a linear structure which is prone
to cryptanalysis if the seed and feedback polynomial is known
or if the LFSR does not have sufficient length (incurring high
area overhead). A TRNG has much higher unpredictability
property. An implementation based on Fibonacci and Galois
Ring Oscillators is presented in [26].
Compared to some of the countermeasures mentioned in
the previous section, our proposed scheme has lower area
overhead, as we are utilizing the existing test compression
infrastructure. Our noise injector countermeasure requires an
area of 106.75 Gate Equivalents (GEs) incurring an overhead
of 0.61% over the table-lookup based S-box AES implemen-
tation in [11] (which needs 17484.25 GEs) with implemented
DfT, using a Faraday 130nm library and synthesized using
Synopsys Design Compiler version C-2009.06-SP3. The area
requirement is less than one-third of that required for the
partial scan countermeasure presented in Section IX-B. A
representative area requirement for Ring Oscillator based
TRNGs is 0.0016 sqmm (or 200 GEs) as presented in [27]
(where for UMC 180 nm employed in the paper, 125 KGEs is
generally contained in one sqmm). Hence, the overhead of the
noise injector countermeasure with an actual TRNG will be
around 1%. The TRNG may also be part of a Cryptographic
SoC as an on-chip random number generator. In such a case,
it would not require any additional hardware resources. Test
application time will however increase by a factor of 1/IFF.
We present here a brief comparison with the weighted (bi-
ased) pseudo-random (WPR) test pattern generation schemes
[28] employed in older Logic BIST solutions before the advent
of test data compression. WPR approach is based on two key
steps. Firstly, bit-fixing is used in which certain idler register
bit positions in the scan chains are assigned to hold fixed
values for certain portions of the test time. This is followed
by Biased pseudo-random (PR) testing, consisting of applying
biased PR test patterns in the variable idler register bits. Our
noise injection technique is different from this approach as we
do not have fixed bit positions in the LFSR deciding the test
cycles where random noise from the TRNG is injected. We
only use certain portions of the LFSR state to derive the noise
injection point.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, security of industrial test compression schemes
against differential scan attacks has been evaluated in detail
for the first time. Scan attack results for all the three major
DfT tools from Synopsys, Cadence and Mentor Graphics are
presented. It is demonstrated that space compression with X-
handling logic is vulnerable to scan attacks, whereas time
compaction acts as a strong countermeasure against scan
attacks. The most well-known scan attack countermeasures are
investigated for their security vulnerability and attack success
results are presented. A new noise injector countermeasure is
proposed and its security properties are analyzed. Future work
would be investigate the scan attack susceptibility of other
time compression techniques, such as Syntest Virtual scan and
Ultra Scan which uses Time Division Demultiplexer(TDDM)
and Multiplexer(TDM).
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